

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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SECRET EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT

November 2, 1962

TO: G - Mr. Johnson

This paper has just been submitted to us for submission to the NSC Executive Committee. Do you wish it to be sent to the White House

Tonight

Tomorrow morning

For the next meeting

Or not sent at this time

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 transferred to CTFADRC
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7-3/88

C. Moor
S/S-S
Ext. 6952

Attachment

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* is informal paper has
gone forward

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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DATE 6/11/88 SER

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November 2, 1962

TO: S/S-Mr. Bruback

FROM: S/P-M. A. Rostow

SUBJECT: Attached Paper entitled "Soviet Scenario for Post-Cuban Negotiations with the US"

The attached paper is proposed for forwarding to Mr. Bundy and for distribution to the NSC Executive Committee. The paper was prepared in accordance with the work program set forth in Report Number 5 of the Planning Sub-Committee and is intended for use in connection with our consideration of problems incident to any post-Cuban negotiation.

Twenty copies are attached for distribution to the Executive Committee.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

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4-6-88

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November 2, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC

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The attached "Soviet Scenario for Post-Cuban Negotiations with the US" has been prepared for background use in connection with the development of US plans for possible post-Cuba negotiations. It was drafted on the basis of judgments developed by a group consisting of officers from S/P, EUR, G/PM, Defense and CIA. Work on the substance of possible negotiating positions is going forward, as indicated in paragraph h., of Report Number Five of the Planning Sub-Committee.

For convenience in drafting, this paper was written from the Soviet point of view. No attempt, however, was made to put it into Sovietese or to develop Kremlin-type argumentation.

W. W. Rostow

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November 2, 1962
The Kremlin, USSR

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SOVIET SCENARIO FOR POST-CUBAN NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE U. S.

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I. Situation

1. The outcome of the Cuban crisis represents a set-back for the USSR the seriousness of which should not be minimized. Certain grave errors must be acknowledged in connection with the entire venture. Our problem at the moment, however, is not to assess blame for the errors, but to appraise the situation as it now exists and to map out a program that will check the adverse effects on our position and insure the most rapid recovery possible.

2. We have suffered both military and political losses. Of major importance is that we have been unable to effect the improvement in our military position we had anticipated through establishment of long-range rocket bases in Cuba. While this is in a sense a negative loss, involving only a failure to get something we did not previously have, it represents a serious set-back in our plans to improve rapidly and with minimal cost our strategic strike power. Moreover, we must recognize that the Americans will see in our Cuban effort evidence that we do not yet possess a sufficiently strong strategic force in the USSR itself to meet our military requirements. This view will probably be reinforced by the fact we avoided during the crisis even a limited military confrontation with the US.

3. The greatest immediate danger we face is that hard-line elements among the Americans may secure the dominant voice and seek

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to take advantage of the evident weakness in our military position and present us with choices between yielding important positions or facing general nuclear war at a time and over issues not of our own choosing. Three circumstances, however, are likely to operate against this danger: (a) the Americans themselves will be appreciative of our ability to wreak terrible destruction on Europe and the US if war should come; (b) the Americans are apt to be far less willing to incur elsewhere the type of risks they incurred in challenging our initiative in Cuba; (c) the world and especially America's allies will exert great pressure against precipitation of another crisis. Nevertheless, because the danger exists we should under present circumstances avoid ourselves precipitating a crisis that would give opportunities to American hotheads.

4. The two foregoing points underscore the most urgent of the needs that now confront us. We must, regardless of whatever other measures we take and regardless of the international atmosphere that may prevail, increase our strategic military strength at the most rapid rate possible. We must also seek to reestablish our power-image even before we have actually redressed the military balance.

5. The only alternative to this would be general and complete disarmament. We continue to favor real disarmament as the best course for the USSR and the peoples' cause generally. However,

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there is no prospect that the Americans under present circumstances will move in this direction except on terms that will be disastrous to us. Their aim has been and will continue to be to get arrangements that will perpetuate our present military inferiority. We cannot seriously consider disarmament until we are in a position of complete equality.

6. A significant lesson from the Cuban experience was that the present "balance of terror" failed to act as an effective deterrent. The Americans reacted to what they considered a threat to their security just as if this were not the age of thermonuclear destruction. The decisive factor may have been their calculation that because of their strategic superiority they would survive a thermonuclear exchange, while the USSR would not. This underscores the urgency of our need to redress fully the present military imbalance. In the longer run, however, it shows complete disarmament to be the only sure means of preserving peace and avoiding general annihilation.

7. Some comrades will doubtless be concerned that our resources will not permit us to close the strategic gap as against the Americans, given the great resources of the US backed by those of Western Europe. This is indeed a very serious matter. We have no alternative, however, but to make the requisite sacrifices. We can hope, moreover, that our technical superiority in rocketry, and, especially, our great lead in space

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will enable us to achieve our goals without incurring the mammoth burdens that would be entailed by an attempt to play out a "numbers game". Our first and greatest need is, therefore, that our scientists and technicians redouble their efforts to enable us fully to exploit the potentialities of space. We can also hope that the Americans will be content with their present strike capability and will not make serious efforts to match us in exploiting the military potentialities of space.

8. The political losses we have suffered consist of serious damage to our own international position and prestige, increased strains within the socialist camp and in the world communist movement greater unity and encouragement in the American camp. We should not minimize the seriousness of these losses and should seek by every prudent means to offset them.

9. While not exaggerating their compensating value, we should recognize and take advantage of certain aspects of Cuban developments that can be considered as favorable to us. Among these are: (a) the concern we demonstrated for the preservation of peace and the restraint we exercised; (b) the fact the Americans accepted our demand to forego invasion of Cuba and to restrain others from such attacks; (c) awareness of our capacity for mass destruction, despite our net nuclear inferiority; (d) the stark demonstration of the seriousness of the overseas bases problem, which in the long run undercuts the

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Americans; (e) the impetus that will be given to the peace movement and the likely derivative support we will get for our various disarmament and other peace proposals; (f) a possible general feeling of revulsion in the West toward any policy or program of action that threatens to bring on a new crisis.

II. Operational Requirements

1. Our major concern must be to improve with all speed our strategic military capability. We should not permit any moves by the Americans, even genuinely conciliatory moves, to divert us from this task. We cannot and must not accept a permanent position of military inferiority.

2. While developing our basic military strength, we should see to repairing and recouping from the damage done to our political position. To this end we have two options before us:

(a) Simply to hold the line against the Americans while employing standard political and propaganda procedures and methods to recoup our over-all international position and otherwise tidy up the consequences of the Cuban setback.

(b) To explore the possibility of serious negotiations with the Americans with the minimal purpose of blunting directly the effects of our Cuban misadventure and the maximal purpose of effecting progress toward a relaxation of tensions, that would reduce immediate dangers and pressures, and perhaps reduce US arms outlays. In light of our present position of relative weaknesses,

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we must move with caution in any negotiations that may be undertaken.

We should avoid being maneuvered into undertaking negotiations in the context of a definitive diplomatic confrontation. For this we must first be in a position of strength. Our major interest at the moment is in securing an improved atmosphere, including perhaps some primarily symbolic agreements.

3. Which of the two above options we choose will have to be made largely dependent on the attitude and conduct of the Americans. The circumstances under which we should adopt the negotiation option, and how we should proceed under it are examined in the remainder of this paper.

II. Basic Considerations Re Negotiation

1. Our prime international objectives at this stage must be:

- a. To minimize the impact of our relative military weakness, and to secure time to overcome this weakness.
- b. To disabuse the Americans from any thought that they now occupy a "position of strength", or that tactics like those applied in the Cuban crisis can be used to force concessions from the Soviet Union or to induce the Soviet Union to modify substantially its long-standing positions on various issues in dispute. The Americans must understand the USSR cannot be intimidated by threats, blackmail or ultimatums. They must also realize that we are prepared

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to go nearer the brink in defending other Soviet interests of greater vitality, such as Berlin, than we were in the case of Cuba.

They must not mistake our actions in the Cuban situation as a case study of our response on all other vital issues.

c. To safeguard all vital positions of the USSR and the countries of the Communist camp.

d. To preserve Soviet leadership within the socialist camp: (1) We must move to arrest the further development of centrifugal forces in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe which have been given encouragement by the outcome in Cuba; (2) at the same time, we must seek to continue rebuilding our assets with Yugoslavia, but not in such a way as to be counter-productive of (1) above; (3) we must also strive to dissuade the Chinese from further adventures which do grave damage to the communist image generally, and run the risk of inviting further military reversals to the camp; and (4) we must seek to retain a communist government in Cuba, but without costly commitments on the part of the USSR.

e. To emphasize and exploit the positive aspects of our handling of the Cuban crisis, notably (a) our contributions to peace through our show of restraint and our willingness to dismantle our bases there rather than plunge the world into thermonuclear war,

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and (b) our success in forcing an American commitment not to invade Cuba. Effective efforts along these lines will assist us in the important task of reestablishing our prestige and influence in nonaligned countries.

f. To capitalize on opportunities arising from developments during the Cuban crisis.

g. To preserve our leadership of the world forces for peace.

h. To achieve such relaxations of tension as are consistent with the above.

2. The desirability of negotiations with the Americans at the summit under existing circumstances will depend upon evidence of whether it will facilitate or obstruct realization of the above objectives.

a. Elements among American ruling circles will doubtless feel that the manner in which the Cuban crisis was liquidated has put the US in a good position to press the USSR on a variety of fronts. They will feel in a "position of strength" and may be willing to incur new risks to gain added advantages.

b. Should the American President share the views of these elements, a summit meeting at this time might lead to clashes of views, or even bring on new confrontations, which might impede realization of our immediate objectives listed above.

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c. A good possibility exists, however, that the President will react differently to the crisis. Now that the crisis is over, he may be deeply sobered by the thought that his country as well as others stood on the brink of disaster.

d. We should, therefore, avoid any initiative for a summit until we have indication of the likely attitude of the American President. If he appears intent on riding a "crest of victory", a meeting should be avoided until time and perhaps new Soviet successes in space, disabuse him. If on the other hand, he shows a sober awareness of the underlying realities of the world power balance and takes a corresponding initiative, we should welcome summit negotiations.

e. While not absolutely essential, the meeting should not take place in New York. We do not wish to do anything under existing circumstances to suggest we are going to a Munich. Moreover, if at all possible the meeting should be at a place and under circumstances that will emphasize the unique and decisive role of the USSR and the US as the sole great powers of the present day. Also the UN does not provide an atmosphere in which serious negotiations can take place.

3. If a summit appears impractical at the present stage, we should not take initiatives looking toward negotiations in other areans. We should respond to any US initiatives that give

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us room for useful maneuver, but should seek in the first instance to use these strictly for exploratory purposes. If we find the Americans under seeming illusions that they can obtain cheap victories, we should stick firmly to our previous positions. If the Americans show evidence of a willingness to make genuine movement, we should be governed by the considerations set forth below.

II. Preconditions for a Summit

1. We should not seek, or accept, any preconditions for a summit. We should also avoid a formal agenda.

III. Tactics at a Summit

1. Our general posture should be one of reasonableness coupled with firmness and serene confidence in our strength. It should suggest satisfaction that the Americans had moved toward our long-standing position that the USSR and the US as the two great powers of the world have a special responsibility for the preservation of peace. Our theme should be that with the present balance of world forces, and particularly with our command of means to totally destroy Europe and the US, the day of power politics, of ultimata, of shows of local force, etc., are gone forever. We, because of our strength, have shown forbearance. But no one should expect us to be alone in this. The responsibility for peace is a joint responsibility. The Soviet and American leaders

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leaders must deal with each other, not from imagined positions of strength, but from positions of acknowledged equality. We must sweep away concepts of "interests" and operational methods that fit the nineteenth century, but only lead to disaster in the new situation history has created.

2. In taking this line our first aim should be to insure an appreciation by President Kennedy of the continuing realities of the world power balance. Any lingering illusions that he can use his present position of strength against us should be fully disabused.

3. We should capitalize to the maximum extent possible on the direct and implied commitments made by President Kennedy during the exchanges on Cuba.

4. We should attempt to exploit fully the logical corollaries of the issues involved in the Cuban crisis: (e.g. any base on a foreign territory is dangerous and objectionable).

5. We should avoid demands (e.g. with regard to Berlin) that appear likely to force a breakdown of the talks, or that might recreate a crisis atmosphere.

6. We should go along with, and encourage, any manifestation of a spirit of detente so long as this fits in with our prime objectives listed above. We should, in particular, attempt to establish the best possible personal K and K relationship.

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7. With regard to specific issues, we should in general leave it to the Americans to come forward with concrete proposals. In responding to these we should seek to get maximum acceptance by the Americans of our specific aims, to prevent flat rejection of those they are unwilling at this stage to accept, and to lay improved foundations for later negotiations.

IV. Position on Major Issues

1. Disarmament

a. Background. In the Cuban exchanges, both sides emphasized the post-crisis need to get on with disarmament. President Kennedy, although not going into specifics, indicated a genuine interest in this subject. American journalists, who may have been officially inspired, voiced some concrete suggestions. Also in UN discussions propositions were put forward which move in directions we have been favoring and which may be acceptable to the Americans. In general, disarmament will probably be the main area of negotiations.

b. Basic Soviet Position. As has been stressed in the preceding discussion, our fundamental purpose should be to frustrate American efforts to get agreements that would contribute to a perpetuation of our relative military inferiority. A

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collorary purpose should be to encourage the Americans to reduce the intensity of their own arms efforts. In case the Americans come forward with specific proposals, we should explore these carefully and nail down any that are in our interest. In this connection, it would be helpful to our over-all policies if even minor progress in the disarmament field could be made. It is also greatly in our interest to blunt as much as possible American concern over our own armament efforts. It goes without saying, however, that we cannot accept any arms control or disarmament arrangement that would involve anything more than token inspection, or that would otherwise limit our freedom to meet our imperative need to redress the present military imbalance. We cannot, for example, embark on any sort of "numbers reduction" since the effect will be to contribute to a perpetuation of our relative weakness.

c. Testing. We have here the best prospects of effecting an agreement, and the impact of an agreement in this area would be very great. We should seek energetically to induce the Americans to go a step further and to accept our total ban proposal without inspection or with only token inspections. Their own great interest in tangible progress in disarmament, and their probable lack of interest in further tests themselves, should make likely their yielding to us on this point. If not, however, we should agree to

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to exclude underground testing from a ban, with an understanding that such tests will be suspended, at least until the two sides have had opportunity to explore fully and exchange information on scientific problems and possibilities re detection without the built-in problems of inspection. We should not agree to an early effective date for these agreements but should handle this in a manner to safeguard our military requirements. It may be possible for us to get the Americans tacitly to agree to allow us "the last round" of tests, because of our later start. This might result in significant military advantage to us.

d. A Declaration on Non-Diffusion. The Americans are much interested in this, although not to a point where they will directly tie their hands in regard to NATO. A declaration would do us no harm, and it might be helpful in our relations with the GDR. It should be of important future use in inhibiting actual implementation of further US nuclear programs for NATO. It could further be important in connection

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connection with German efforts to secure a national nuclear capability, in deepening the US-French split on this issue, and in connection with our campaign to secure effective liquidation of all bases. We should seek to get the declaration as broad as possible, and then go along with it. This would also have an important impact on world opinion.

e. Nuclear Free Zones. We should seize upon the proposals put forward by the Brazilians and others that nuclear free zones be established in Latin America and Africa. We should propose other free zones (the Rapacki Plan, a Scandinavian Free Zone, a Near Eastern Free Zone, an Asian Free Zone). In agreeing to free zones in only Latin America and Africa, we should stress that these were first stops. We should seek to secure maximum reliance on a declaratory commitment of the countries involved, with minimal inspection arrangements.

f. Non-deployment of land-based strategic nuclear weapons. It is possible that for reasons of their own the Americans will be interested in an agreement with us by which we will both forego deployment of land-based nuclear weapons with strategic capabilities outside our respective national territories. The Americans would probably be willing to include dismantling at some later date installations they already have in England, Italy and Turkey, since these installations have only limited military value. They would

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expect to substitute a multilateral sea-based force, (Polaris) which they may do in any circumstance. An agreement of this sort would be of little immediate military significance to us, but it might be of great potential value to us, especially in connection with the German problem. It might also have important political repercussions, and it could be fitted into and made to further our general campaign against overseas bases of all descriptions. Since we have deployed Soviet weapons outside the USSR only in the case of Cuba, and have now given these up, we should be quite receptive to such American proposals. We should also attempt to tie this proposition in with the whole base problem, at least in principle.

g. American Overseas Bases. As already suggested, our initiative in discussion of the disarmament problem should concentrate on the necessity of the US liquidating its overseas bases. We have already made clear the parallel between US bases abroad and our bases in Cuba. We should concentrate on this point, both as an independent item of discussion and in connection with all other disarmament questions. The Americans at this stage will doubtless not be willing to accept even in principle our position on this matter, and they may refuse even to discuss it as such. We can, however, be sure that they are fully aware of the strength of our arguments. A number of Americans of influence, particularly journalists, have freely admitted the inconsistency of the US stand on Cuba and the

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maintenance of their own overseas bases. We should, therefore, be able to make considerable progress toward laying a foundation for a change in the US position.

h. Disarmament in Outer Space. On the basis of past indications, the Americans seem to be willing to enter into a simple joint declaratory commitment to exclude outer space from the armaments race. Since our space program lends itself to rapid conversion to military purposes while the American apparently does not, such a declaration might result in important military advantage to us. The declaration would, however, inhibit our exploitation of our lead in space to enhance directly our power-image. We consequently need to approach this problem with great circumspection. We should in any event try to get our of consideration of this problem an end to the threat of US surveillance by means of its space vehicles.

i. Surprise Attack. The Americans may revive some of their old proposals such as "the open skies", exchange of "observations teams", etc. We should side-track these as obviously aimed at espionage.

j. Surveillance. We should be especially concerned to follow-up on the Cuban crisis to get a firm US commitment not to engage in air surveillance, not only over the territory of the USSR and the socialist countries but over the territory of any sovereign state.

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state.

k. Measures to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.

The Americans will probably bring up again such proposals as direct bilateral telephone communications, etc. We should respond favorably to these, but should reserve our position on the timing and details of implementation arrangements.

1. General and Complete Disarmament. Aside from the specific issues noted above, we should repeat our long-standing proposals. We cannot, of course, expect to get acceptance of those proposals, but it should be possible to get agreement for renewed efforts at Geneva and possibly a formula calling for a new approach on both sides.

2. Berlin. The way in which we approach the Berlin problem should largely depend on the attitude of the Americans. We must, of course, introduce the Berlin question into any discussion and must reiterate our previously stated position on this problem. Should the Americans show a "crisis sensitivity" toward Berlin we should by-pass the question in these discussions, but leave it clear that this is an item of unfinished business that has to be settled before tensions can be fully relaxed and the danger of a new war reduced. Should the Americans show a willingness to move on the Berlin question, we should explore all particular possibilities.

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Depending on the degree of agreement possible, we could either lay foundations for further negotiations or reach a definite interim understanding on particular points. The following are likely to be the most fruitful areas of exploration:

a. Access. We should seek to get acceptance of a GDR role.

b. We should seek to get agreement to an anti-subversion commitment, possibly in conjunction with UN enforcement responsibility.

c. We should consider an exchange of a relaxation of border rigidity between East and West Berlin (family visits, etc.) in exchange for US commitments not to assist or connive at escape attempts, positive efforts to avoid incidents at the wall, and improved economic relations between the GDR and FRG. We should not, however, weaken in any way the principle of absolute GDR sovereignty over East Berlin and its consequent right to control its own borders.

d. As a matter of principle, we should get commitment that offensive weapons and forces are not and will not be deployed in West Berlin, preferably with UN inspection to insure compliance.

e. We should explore the possibility that the US will agree to a formula that will permit a separate treaty with the GDR with only interim guarantees that so-called western rights in West Berlin will be preserved. This formula might provide for a gradual

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takeover of the "western rights" by the UN, including especially occupation rights and rights re guaranteed access.

3. A NATO-Warsaw Pact Detente. The ground has been well prepared for this and we can expect the Americans to agree to several things that will have the effect of further legitimatizing the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe.

a. We can expect to get agreement to some form of non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization. This is something we have long sought. While from the military standpoint it will be only a piece of paper, it should be a step toward de facto recognition of the GDR and final acceptance of the permanence of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. It may also stir West German suspicion of the US.

b. We have also good prospects of securing commitments to accept existing boundaries in Eastern and Central Europe. The Americans will insist on protecting their legal position re German boundaries by calling them "demarcation lines", but the effect will nevertheless be their de facto recognition.

c. It may be possible to get some sort of US commitment that will inhibit or limit the remilitarization of West Germany, especially in the nuclear field.

4. Non-Interference

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4. Non-Interference in the Affairs of Other States. One of

our major aims has consistently been to inhibit counter-revolutionary activity on the part of the US and its allies. We have largely committed our prestige to preventing such activity. In the Cuban crisis we were able to secure a US commitment not to undertake and to restrain other American countries from undertaking direct measures against the revolutionary regime in Cuba. We should seek to secure a broadening of this commitment and to get it extended to other areas. If we cannot attain this end immediately, we should nevertheless be able to lay important foundations "in principle".

5. Positive Cooperation between the US and the USSR. The Americans will probably be interested in going forward with such proposals as increased cultural contacts, cooperation in various scientific fields, cooperation in outer space, etc. We should concur in declarations of intent as this can be an important factor in reducing tension.

6. Southeast Asia. The Americans may want to get us to assume new obligations in Laos and South Vietnam. We should limit ourselves to reaffirming our previous commitments re the Laos settlement.

7. Sino-Indian Conflict. In the unlikely event the Americans raise this matter, we should avoid any substantive discussion.

8. Cuba

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8. Cuba and Latin America.

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The Americans may seek to induce us to write off Cuba and to agree to refrain from support of progressive forces in Latin America. We should meet this with arguments that the US should abandon support of reactionary regimes, to regard honestly the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others, and to forego play with such dangerous things as "special warfare", counter-insurgency, etc.

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November 2, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC

F. Q. (1)

The attached "Soviet Scenario for Post-Cuban Negotiations with the US" has been prepared for background use in connection with the development of US plans for possible post-Cuba negotiations. It was drafted on the basis of judgments developed by a group consisting of officers from S/P, EUR, G/PM, Defense and CIA. Work on the substance of possible negotiating positions is going forward, as indicated in paragraph h., of Report Number Five of the Planning Sub-Committee.

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W. W. Rostow

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F739044-1074

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